This week we ask: should the state fund fertility treatment? Or would this feed in to pro-natalist philosophy?
When we talk about funding healthcare, most of us think of hospitals, waiting lists, and limited budgets. But what about fertility — and the question of whether everyone should have the chance, or even the right, to have children?
At a time of intense pressure on public spending, should the state cover the cost of fertility treatment? That question depends on what kind of good we think fertility treatment is. Is it simply another part of healthcare, like cancer treatment, competing for the same limited funds? Or does fertility occupy a different moral space — something unique that society has a special reason to support?
To help us think through these questions, our host Emily McTernan is joined by Dr. Giulia Cavaliere, Lecturer in Engaged Philosophy at UCL.
Mentioned in this episode:
[00:00:05] Emily McTernan: Hello, this is UCL Uncovering Politics, and this week we ask: should the state fund fertility treatment?
My name is Emily McTernan, and welcome to UCL Uncovering Politics, the podcast of the School of Public Policy and Department of Political Science at University College London.
When we think about funding healthcare, our minds often go straight to hospitals, waiting lists, and the problems of limited resources. But what about fertility, and the right, or perhaps the hope, to have children? Should the state pay for fertility treatment?
Well, that depends on what kind of good fertility treatment is. If it is simply one part of healthcare, to be funded alongside cancer treatments in a system under strain, it might look difficult to justify treating infertility rather than life-limiting or life-threatening illness.
Or, with that comparison, have we missed something? Is there something special about getting to have genetically related children, such that it is a project we should all fund?
Today we're joined by Dr Giulia Cavaliere, who has recently joined us here at UCL as a Lecturer in Engaged Philosophy in the Philosophy Department.
She has published a string of articles on the significance of infertility and the desire to have a child, and has defended the legitimacy of funding fertility services. So welcome, Giulia, to the podcast.
[00:01:26] Giulia Cavaliere: Thanks, Emily. Thanks for having me.
[00:01:29] Emily McTernan: Let's get started with your case for funding fertility treatment, before we get to the reasons some people have had doubts. Why should we pay for it?
[00:01:36] Giulia Cavaliere: Thanks, Emily. Excellent intro, and you're right, there are lots of people who are at least sceptical or opposed to funding fertility treatment.
I personally think that the desire to have children is really important. For those who have that desire, satisfying it contributes to their wellbeing. And for people who are unsure about whether we should satisfy desires, because people can have all sorts of desires, satisfying this particular desire also contributes to flourishing. Having children is something that is considered, if not essential, then at least very important to living a flourishing life.
So that is the first step of the argument. I want to show, and I try to show, that the frustration of this desire causes suffering. There are lots of studies on people undergoing fertility treatment, or people with infertility who are unable to conceive and have a strong desire to procreate. For them, the frustration of this preference or desire negatively affects their wellbeing.
I do not think this justifies funding fertility treatment by itself, because people have all sorts of preferences. But it gives us what we call in philosophy pro tanto reasons, reasons that can be countered by other considerations, to take seriously the satisfaction of this particular desire. So that is the first step of the argument.
[00:03:07] Emily McTernan: Great. So the first thought is that it helps alleviate suffering, and promotes wellbeing and flourishing. What do you say to people who point to the literature showing that having a child leads to a dip in satisfaction, basically until they leave home at 18? Is that a worry for you empirically, or do you think we can get around that?
[00:03:25] Giulia Cavaliere: That is a good question. I get this objection quite often, especially at dinner parties: "they make my life miserable".
There is a lot of interesting literature on regret, and it is important that this is becoming more widely known, so people are aware that it is not just joy and satisfaction.
But I think what is interesting here is that although wellbeing seems to go down when people have children, the sense of meaningfulness goes up. People say it is not pleasurable, but it contributes to meaning in life, to a sense of self, and to developing as an autonomous person.
So yes, there are studies showing that wellbeing is negatively affected once we become parents, but I think that is countered by other considerations about flourishing.
[00:04:20] Emily McTernan: Great. So meaning is the focus. I suppose it is that idea that on your deathbed, you want to be surrounded by your children, not your hobby. Is that the thought? No one wishes they had spent more time at work.
[00:04:29] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah, maybe that's the thought. Although I always wonder whether we should give epistemic value to life preferences at the point of death. But yes, maybe.
[00:04:38] Emily McTernan: Yes, maybe not. Maybe deathbed preferences are a really poor guide to judgement.
I was actually thinking of another bit of philosophy that often comes up in the context of choosing to have children, or thinking about this as a preference, which is the idea that it is a transformative experience. This comes from L. A. Paul, who argues that certain kinds of decisions we make — including becoming a vampire and having children — lead you to become such a different person, with different preferences, that it is very hard to know in advance whether it is something you want for yourself.
You are not convinced by that either. You think these are preferences we should take seriously and satisfy.
[00:05:12] Giulia Cavaliere: It is interesting. I love the book and the paper on the transformative experience of parenthood. But I think what I am interested in is the desire itself.
I think — and this should be uncontroversial — that people's lives go better if their preferences, and informed preferences, are satisfied. So yes, maybe you have a child and your life becomes miserable, but you do not know that beforehand. All we have, really, is the desire. And we know that it is not just a trivial desire — like Rawls says, counting blades of grass. It seems more important than that, or more meaningful.
So I think, yes, why not? Maybe...
[00:05:52] Emily McTernan: Great. So we have gone back to meaning. There is something about the meaningfulness of this decision, and the meaning it gives to your life, which I am sure sounds plausible to lots of listeners. But you are telling us that is not enough. That is not going to give me an argument for funding this. Why is that?
[00:06:05] Giulia Cavaliere: Actually, the paper that inspired me to think about these things is your paper, Emily, on the fact that people have all sorts of preferences and desires. For example, they might have a very strong preference to have intimate relationships — the value of friendship, romantic partners — or a preference to have a certain type of career.
But we do not normally think that the state should fund all of these. First, because we have limited resources. But also because there is a view in political philosophy that the state should be neutral among conceptions of the good. So if, for example, the state suddenly decides that what matters are intimate relationships, and focuses its resources on promoting that good, then at least some political philosophers would say that it fails to treat citizens as free and equal.
So there is this neutrality-oriented worry.
[00:07:00] Emily McTernan: So this is the idea that if you have a conservative government that says, "Everyone should get married, I am going to fund loads of marriage programmes, this is the best way of life," there is something very objectionable about the state making those choices for you.
[00:07:10] Giulia Cavaliere: Exactly. Yes, exactly that. And I think it is similar with children, especially because a lot of people do not want children. Children do not feature in their conception of the good. So I think it would be objectionable for the state to impose this.
The really interesting question — which was actually raised in your paper, Emily — is why this preference, and not preferences for other things?
In the paper, I do not really go into that, which I think is a limitation. But I am trying to solve this issue in the book I am currently writing.
I have this argument — in a nutshell — that high-income nations are facing population decline and population ageing. These countries are going through changes in the structure of their populations, with a higher proportion of older people, fewer children being born, and more people dying. So the population is declining.
The worry is that in order to sustain our ageing populations, we need people who pay taxes that can be invested in healthcare and other institutions, such as pensions. That is how many welfare states work.
So the idea is that we need children to contribute to our pensions, healthcare and so on. We need a constant supply of new workers. And now we have this happy accident, where some people really want to have children — and we really need children.
My suggestion in the book is that we treat the preference to have children, or the preference to have genetically related children, as a prudential public good. A good that is worth fostering, given that if we have fewer children, our lives and our institutions will need to change significantly.
[00:09:04] Emily McTernan: So it's a philosophical defence of the pro-natalist tendencies we're seeing emerge in politics. Is that right? Yes, we do need more kids. People are going to have to start having more children.
[00:09:13] Giulia Cavaliere: Yes. I know pro-natalism is not very popular among philosophers, and especially among feminist theorists. But I do think it should never be imposed — it should always align with people's desires.
It is true that some people — although these studies might not be entirely reliable because they are based on self-reporting — consistently say they want to have children and cannot, or that they want to have more children than they actually do.
Now, the structure of the labour market has changed significantly. More people go to university, so they start their careers later. It takes longer to achieve financial stability. All these factors may contribute to lowering birth rates. But that does not necessarily align with people's preferences.
So yes, it is a cautious defence of pro-natalism.
[00:10:04] Emily McTernan: I love it. I suppose one question people might have is: why does that lead us to funding fertility treatment, rather than fixing the fact that doing a job and having a child is really hard, or impossible, given the cost of childcare? Or ensuring that fertile people get more financial support to have children?
Why is fertility treatment for people who are unable to have children the right use of resources?
[00:10:25] Giulia Cavaliere: Yes, that is an excellent question. I do not think the two (or the three, or the four) are mutually exclusive.
I do think that so-called pro-natalist policies, for example free childcare or education, help especially cis women, or women in general, who are responsible for the largest share of raising children. These policies also promote children's wellbeing, because they are less affected by their parents' financial situations and so on.
All these policies are very important. They protect certain interests — the interests of mothers and the interests of children. But I also think that they do not seem to be enough. Even in countries that have enacted these policies, birth rates have not changed significantly.
It may be too soon to say, there are debates about this, but consistently they have failed. I am not saying that funding fertility treatment would single-handedly solve birth rates. It is a case where certain people have this kind of desire, and there are obstacles to satisfying it, and the state could help.
In that sense, I think it is very different from, for example, the desire to have an intimate relationship or a career, because it generates positive externalities that those other projects may not. That is the idea.
[00:11:58] Emily McTernan: Since I am the one-project-amongst-many person in the room, as Giulia has given away, I suppose one might think that the way you are describing what you call a prudential public good could apply to things like careers, and possibly even intimate relationships.
These are things that have good effects for all of us. In the case of careers, if you are really into your work, you earn more money for the tax system that benefits us all. If you have an intimate relationship, we know your mental and physical health will be better, particularly if you are a man.
So you might think those two would also get funded under your framework, insofar as funding is needed.
[00:12:34] Giulia Cavaliere: Yes, that is an excellent point.
[00:12:36] Emily McTernan: Which might not be a problem, right? That might be fine for you.
[00:12:38] Giulia Cavaliere: No, no, it is an excellent point. As I said, you inspired basically the whole book — this paper inspired it, so you should link it.
The idea is that I think this is a way to think about life projects with a neutrality-sensitive justification for funding. I do think that, for example, funding the arts, education, or promoting implementation can be justified in this way.
There are certain life projects that more directly, or more obviously, produce positive externalities, good outcomes that are then shared among citizens, rather than just benefiting the individuals who pursue those projects.
So I do not think we should only fund fertility treatment. It may be that other projects count as prudential public goods. This is a way to distinguish between projects that do not have this feature and those that do. That is the idea.
[00:13:41] Emily McTernan: And I suppose if you add your meaning condition, then we get even more specialness around the case of having children, potentially.
[00:13:48] Giulia Cavaliere: Yes.
[00:13:49] Emily McTernan: Insofar as people find that profoundly important for meaning.
[00:13:52] Giulia Cavaliere: Yes. I am of that view, but I can absolutely imagine an Emily pushing me on the idea that people find meaning in intimate relationships and careers.
And I do think that is true. These are projects that are considered valuable, that contribute to wellbeing. So they have those two features. Plus, in this day and age, given how the population is structured and how our institutions work, having children also contributes to other people's wellbeing in this indirect way.
[00:14:27] Emily McTernan: The other part of your paper, not dealing with the tricky people who say "what about the other life projects", talks about norm legitimation. The idea that funding fertility treatment might legitimise problematic social norms around genetic relatedness and reproduction in parenting. Could you talk us through that a bit?
[00:14:44] Giulia Cavaliere: Yes, sure.
[00:14:45] Emily McTernan: What is the worry?
[00:14:45] Giulia Cavaliere: So yeah, this is a worry that has been expressed by feminist theorists since the beginning of this debate on fertility. So at the beginning with IVF, so in-vitro fertilization, people or feminist theorists were really opposed to that because they thought, "oh look, is another way in which women's bodies are used".
And then there are these objectionable pro-natallist norms, so that, for example, people need to have children. This is a way to have a flourishing life. And then some feminist, some feminist theories additionally say there is sort of this pressure in society to have, quote unquote "your own children". So children that you are biologically or genetically related to.
So unlike them, I don't think that the preference to procreate, so to be pregnant or to have children that are in some ways related to you is objection on one in itself. So I think the disagreement is there. So they think it's not just that, it leads to bad outcomes for people.
For example, fewer, fewer children being adopted or adoptive family being stigmatized, or women being expected even more to have children. This is, I agree that there can be some of these implications, but I don't think there is anything wrong in itself with the preference to have biologically or genetically related children.
Whereas I think they sort of see as focusing too much on genetic ties and that there is something wrong with that. Whereas I see it a bit as like, for example, like sort of sexual preferences.
So obviously, there are, there is a connection between people having heterosexual preferences in romantic relationship and homosexual people being stigmatized as a result. But I don't think there is something in inherently wrong with, for example, as a woman preferring to date men or vice versa. So that's the idea.
[00:16:30] Emily McTernan: Just unfortunate but not wrong. Is that the thought?
[00:16:32] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah. Yeah, that's the idea. And then I think we should work on the sort of implications of these, for example, for adoption and so on. But they do not think that there is something wrong in itself with the preference.
[00:16:43] Emily McTernan: The preference to have genetically related children. Yeah. Okay, great. Which is controversial in philosophy, but may not sound controversial to people outside philosophy.
[00:16:51] Giulia Cavaliere: Ah, yeah.
[00:16:51] Emily McTernan: Um, so I guess the thing that worries the people inside philosophy is something like then people won't adopt. Is that right? So the thought is we have lots and lots of children who need a loving home.
[00:17:02] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah.
[00:17:03] Emily McTernan: Wouldn't it be better if we decentered our focus on genetic relatedness and instead gave existing children a good home?
[00:17:10] Giulia Cavaliere: Yes. So, so that's, that's an excellent point. And yeah, people worry that fewer children will be adopted as a result. For example, if we fund fertility treatment, all the people with infertility that might have adopted, they would go for fertility treatment.
So I have a response to this in the, in the book, and I have this paper on adoption that is currently under review. But I do think that the state has obligations towards children in need and children in need of adoption, for example, but do not think that these obligations amount to ensuring that there is a sufficiently large pool of available parents.
So I think the status obligation towards children and the status potentially, or potentially obligation towards people who are infertile. That's part of the debate. And then I think these things can be fulfilled in different ways, so these obligations. So for example, the state should ensure that children in care have adequate conditions for flourishing so that they are well looked after. And this might mean, for example, improving institutions they're in. But I'm not sure that justice require the states to provide children with adoptive parents. So I think this is a stronger claim and would be like a sort of, very demanding view of what justice requires. So I think, yeah, it might be, even if I'm not sure empirically, that funding fertility treatment, move some people who would adopt towards fertility treatment instead. But I just don't think that not funding is a solution to the adoption problem. So to the children who are struggling and are not being adopted.
[00:18:46] Emily McTernan: I guess feminist might be worried about another pernicious norm, since we're talking about the pro-natalists, which is this essentialist view of women. Right? That the, the goal of being a woman is to have babies of your own and gestate them. And so we should pour resources into ensuring as many women as possible do this. Are you at all swayed by the thought that a state aggressively funding fertility treatment, in the way that I think would come out of the kind of arguments you're giving us, if it's really a demand of justice that we provide this. Uh, is that gonna encourage that view, that women's purpose is babies?
[00:19:20] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah. So again, excellent question and I I, so I'm a bit ambivalent on this, and so I might as well just not be too strong, um, in my reply. So I think it's, it is a worry, especially the essentialist view that you were talking about. So the fact that women sort of have to fulfill a certain social learning society, which is to become mothers, and then also the primary care of the child. And I do, I'm, I'm also of the view that like funding a certain service, also health services, is like an expressing support for a, for example, this particular project.
At the same time, to avoid this sort of like pernicious implications, we think that we are best placed in judging what women should do. Which I don't think sits well again with some feminist, and I think I'm one of them. Because the idea is that we say well, we know what's better for you guys, better than you know, and so we don't want to fund this treatment because we are worried that you will be under increased pressure to procreate.
So this is true. But this is also true that women, it might be because of social norms, but women are suffering as a result of infertility. So I think it's like quite a strong position to say, well, your suffering is just created by the social norms. If this social norm ceases to exist, then you'll be fine. This might be true, but there is also the problem of like transitioning from the society we have now to that kind of society. And in the meanwhile, I'm not sure that disregarding the preference is the best way to go.
[00:20:56] Emily McTernan: So we have a transitional justice reason to continue to fund fertility treatment even under a heteronormative regime, is the thought.
[00:21:04] Giulia Cavaliere: Yes. That's
[00:21:04] Emily McTernan: ideally we'll get beyond that regime God, but if I don't, then at least we've got this coming out.
[00:21:08] Giulia Cavaliere: Oh God. Yeah. That's maybe the thought.
[00:21:10] Emily McTernan: Fantastic. That's nice and clear.
Okay, let's, let's talk a bit about like, how much are we on the hook for here? Do you have a view on the scale of funding you're arguing for here?
[00:21:20] Giulia Cavaliere: So, yeah, that's, so that's interesting because I, I did a deep dive into like fertility policies in high income countries and I realized that even countries like the UK or fund, which fund fertility treatment they fund so few cycles. For example, one cycle of IVF. Or they ask like Italy or in Belgium, they ask people to fund part of the treatment. So for example, yeah, the state pays, but actually if you look in the fine prints, you realize that people who want to have children have to invest quite a lot of money in this.
So in the, so I try to do some sort of like, um, baby health economics in the book and try to think about what's the most cost effective way to go about this. And it seems to be that, what I would recommend if I was not just an armchair philosopher, would be six cycles and there, so six cycles of IVF. And the reason for this is actually that many people, uh, do not conceive on the first cycle. So for some people, especially older women where there is the highest demand, one cycle is basically like completely useless because it's very unlikely for, for IVF to work on the first cycle. So then we need to think what are the chances versus not going, going through in like too invasive treatment because I, yeah, she's invasive. And so I think, like I did some kind of modeling and I think six cycles, at least according to certain views in health economics, is the one that produces the most live birth among the group that is in most need, which is older women. So that's the idea. So I don't want to advocate for the sort of like unbridled or like, um, like covering everything type policy because I also think there should be a sort of resource that need to be allocated somewhere else. And there might be reason to stop at some point in a sort of paternalistic way. But I do think the six cycle cycles provides the best chances to the population that, um, is, let's say, most need of this kind of treatment. Even if, I don't think it's a need, but it's sort of like who benefit the most from this treatment.
[00:23:28] Emily McTernan: That justice requires that we provide to them. I think it's a little stronger than it would be nice to do this in your picture. Is that right?
[00:23:35] Giulia Cavaliere: So, I think so. Justice, yes. But I, I do not think it's a requirement justice. So I think it's this public good view. Because certain people have these preferences and because, um, we consider this preference to lead to valuable outcomes, then I do think the state should fund because of that. So this is the first part.
But then the second part is that everyone benefits from having more children, and so I think it's unfair, and that's the justice bit of the argument. So justice as fairness. Is unfair to ask prospective parents to fund for something that actually everyone benefits from, right?
So for example, if I pay, I dunno, 5K, 5,000 pounds for treatment, and the treatment works, then I create a taxpayer and then everyone, so like my neighbor doesn't have kids and my neighbor has kids that as, um, conceived naturally, they all benefit from me having children. So this is the sort of justice based requirements. So it's public goods plus this.
[00:24:33] Emily McTernan: Great.
And so you've got these six cycles of IVF. I assume that there might be, in your view, some thoughts about which treatments we should pay for in terms of effectiveness. So if, if it's a public goods like argument, it's like we're all gonna benefit. You are gonna want people to do the cheapest, most effective treatment, even I assume, if that comes with some trade offs of their preference.
So here I'm thinking of things like using donor eggs to increase the chances that IVF is successful. Not gonna be a genetically related child to the woman then, but is more likely to result in a live birth under certain conditions.
[00:25:03] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah.
[00:25:04] Emily McTernan: Is that the way your view's gonna go?
[00:25:05] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah.
[00:25:05] Emily McTernan: Or using a surrogate for instance, rather than you having a uterus transplant.
It may well be much cheaper to use surrogates who we know successfully sustained pregnancies then to undergo some kind of radical treatment that now exists, like having a, an entire uterus transplanted.
[00:25:18] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah. So good. Excellent question. So I do think, yeah, cost effectiveness. Should play a role, especially because it is this idea that it's costly to provide it. So we shouldn't just, um, we shouldn't just take into account the preferences of the person who undergoes treatment.
So donor eggs, for example, increases increase significantly the chances, especially when it's sort of like what is sometimes called age related infertility in women. With surrogacy I find it a bit more difficult because I, so I never write, I don't write on surrogacy because I changed my mind almost yearly on the permissibility of this practice. So in the book and in generally, my papers, I never talk about surrogacy because I think it, it's a bit different to. So there is a, sorry, there is a sort of like difference that is just not just like a different but normative difference between using somebody's eggs that were donated. Or, uh, asking a person to carry out a pregnancy for you. So I think at the moment, so this year I'm under of the view that there is something special, not in terms of like beautiful, but something like sw s about pregnancy. And so I'm not that the state should, for example, cover this practice because I think it's, well, it's right for exploitation. Um. I'm not sure that we can make sure that these contracts are, people have the option to pull out. So it's, it's complicated. So I'm not sure that, I mean, I don't want to endorse it in any way.
Um, but you're right that lately, there's been quite a lot of discussions in the UK about uterus transplantation in the UK and abroad. Because it's much more costly than IVF because it requires a big surgery and then taking time off work and also requires a donor undergoes this sort of hysterectomy, which saw the removal of the uterus, which again is much more invasive than just, donating eggs.
[00:27:16] Emily McTernan: Great. So they're gonna raise some extra questions. So we've been talking a bunch about your paper and then we've moved to the book. So is that the next step with this project for you into the book next?
[00:27:25] Giulia Cavaliere: The book is being written at the moment, so it will take a while to come out, but it will come out eventually.
But yeah, the book I think, develops some of these ideas and is a sort of like defense of the view that the state ought to fund, uh, fertility treatment. Um, and then it goes through a bunch of objections because philosophers like that. And so it goes through a bunch of objections, for example, related to climate change, adoption, and feminist concerns that we also touched upon today.
[00:27:54] Emily McTernan: I did wonder about the climate change thing. So we, we've got this story of the public and of having them 'cause it pays for our pensions and our healthcare. But you might think a declining population is a good thing for all of us as well.
[00:28:06] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah, so, so I, I haven't gone too much into this debate, but there is a whole debate on like procreation and climate change. So, for example, some people say that we should limit ourselves to one child, or we should also refrain from procreate.
So I have a very underdeveloped view and this, so a lot of these I think is contingent on like empirical consideration. So for example, climate change would be a negative externally. So sort of negative outcome of having children because you produce another polluter basically. Especially in the in high income countries where you have the population decline in aging problem, but you're also among the biggest polluters, the citizens are the biggest polluters on earth. So there is this concern that it doesn't just produce positive outcomes, it also produces negative.
I think like, I mean it's, it's complicated because at the moment our institution cannot survive if we continue this way. So there is the worry of like, yeah, maybe it affects climate change, but at the same time some institutions collapse and so it's gonna look after our older population who's gonna fund healthcare. So the sort of trade off.
But obviously the focus here is on high income. So from a global justice perspective, it would be. Potentially good for us to stop having children. So I'm not sure about this. One thing I want, I wonder what you think about this, Emily. So one thing I'm sometimes thinking about and I don't really understand the environmentalist argument here, is that there's a sort of idea where like activities that are polluting, so for example, driving a car, traveling by plane, having children, they're like -they are discussed as if they were the same thing. So I find it very odd to think like there are all these debates, also in academia, we should stop flying to conferences and which totally true. We should take the train. But it seems like that conferences are just measured in terms of how polluting the activities. But there is a lot we gain from con conf, at least arguably, like we make new friends, we develop new ideas, and I think it would be a very impoverished view of our social work if we just think of these activities including having children, based on how much we pollute the environment. And maybe like environmentalists will be like horrified by this view and, but I wonder what you think.
[00:30:22] Emily McTernan: I'm tempted by that too. It's almost like they haven't put the other bit in the cost benefit analysis. Right? Here are the harms, so what about the goods?
[00:30:27] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah, right.
[00:30:28] Emily McTernan: What is it that we're actually getting?
[00:30:30] Giulia Cavaliere: Maybe. Yeah, exactly.
[00:30:30] Emily McTernan: Something like this.
[00:30:31] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah, yeah, yeah. No, no, no. Yeah.
[00:30:33] Emily McTernan: And I think there's sometimes a misunderstanding of what the good is of something like an in person event as well.
I'm never very convinced by these moves to being online for everything, because I just think it misses the socialness. That was meant to be part of this.
[00:30:43] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah. Okay.
[00:30:44] Emily McTernan: I'm not really just there to listen to someone's talk.
[00:30:46] Giulia Cavaliere: Yeah, exactly.
[00:30:47] Emily McTernan: But maybe you would.
[00:30:47] Giulia Cavaliere: That's, yeah, that's the idea.
[00:30:48] Emily McTernan: Fantastic. Thank you so much for coming on. It is been brilliant to talk about a philosophical version of prenatal list policies and the funding of six cycles of IVF, which does sound like a much more generous and appropriate amount than some of the NH. Limitations that we're currently seeing. So today we've been looking at Julie's paper, "Fertility Treatment, Valuable Life Projects and Social Norms in Defense of Defending Reproductive Preferences" published in the Journal Bioethics, as well as her book to come. As ever, these details are gonna be in the show notes for this episode.
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I'm Emily McTernan. This episode was produced by Eleanor Kingwell-Banham. Our theme music is written and performed by John Mann. This has been UCL Uncovering Politics. Thank you for listening.